{"id":3929,"date":"2025-12-08T15:23:52","date_gmt":"2025-12-08T07:23:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/?p=3929"},"modified":"2026-01-07T15:32:37","modified_gmt":"2026-01-07T07:32:37","slug":"why-the-us-will-not-abandon-taiwan-not-in-1971-not-in-1979-and-certainly-not-in-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/why-the-us-will-not-abandon-taiwan-not-in-1971-not-in-1979-and-certainly-not-in-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the US will not abandon Taiwan \u2014 not in 1971, not in 1979, and certainly not in 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

By Professor Dr. Phar Kim Beng, Professor of ASEAN Studies at IINTAS-IIUM and <\/em>Expert Committee Member of CROSS<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

For decades, analysts have speculated whether the US might one day \u201cwalk away\u201d from Taiwan, especially as China\u2019s power grows. But such speculation misunderstands the full arc of American policy. From 1971 to 2026, Washington has repeatedly demonstrated that even when recognising Beijing diplomatically, it has never relinquished its commitments to Taiwan\u2019s security, autonomy, and survival.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The passage of the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 only reaffirms this longstanding reality.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

To understand why, one must revisit the diplomatic turning points that shaped US\u2013Taiwan policy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

1971-1979: Recognition of Beijing without abandoning Taipei<\/strong><\/h5>\n
\n

When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 (1971), transferring China\u2019s seat from Taipei to Beijing, many believed Taiwan\u2019s international future was doomed. Washington supported the vote, yet the shift did not erase Taiwan from US strategic thinking.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The following year, President Richard Nixon\u2019s historic visit to China produced the Shanghai Communiqu\u00e9 (1972), where the US \u201cacknowledged\u201d \u2014 but did not accept \u2014 Beijing\u2019s position that Taiwan is part of China. This distinction was intentional. From that moment onwards, American policy rested on strategic ambiguity: recognising Beijing while refusing to endorse its claim over Taiwan.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

When full normalisation occurred in 1978, with Washington recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China, the US again reaffirmed that Taiwan\u2019s future must be determined peacefully. And on Jan 1, 1979, when the US formally ended diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Congress moved swiftly to fill the vacuum.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Within months, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) \u2014 a legislative masterstroke that ensured:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n
  • Continued US arms sales to Taiwan<\/li>\n
  • Uninterrupted commercial and cultural ties<\/li>\n
  • A clear warning that any coercive takeover of Taiwan would be a matter of \u201cgrave concern\u201d to the US<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
    \n

    The TRA remains binding US law. No president can repeal it. No administration can ignore it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Washington may have recognised Beijing, but it never abandoned Taipei.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    Taiwan\u2019s lobbying power and American elites<\/strong><\/h5>\n
    \n

    While the TRA provided legal protection, Taiwan built political resilience in Washington through one of the most sophisticated lobbying ecosystems in US foreign policy. Taipei invested in think tanks, congressional outreach, semiconductor partnerships, and long-term relationships across the American elite.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Taiwan\u2019s role in the global economy \u2014 particularly its dominance of advanced semiconductor manufacturing \u2014 further cemented its indispensability. For US defence systems, artificial intelligence\u00a0breakthroughs, and aerospace technologies, Taiwan is no longer a distant partner: it is a strategic core.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Taiwan became a political reality that no US president can afford to ignore.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    Japan enters the equation \u2014 Through a crisis that almost collapsed a prime minister<\/strong><\/h5>\n
    \n

    Taiwan\u2019s importance is not merely bilateral. In 2025\u20132026, Taiwan became the epicentre of a political storm inside Japan \u2014 and an unexpected catalyst for deeper US\u2013Japan\u2013Taiwan alignment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Contrary to many media portrayals, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had no intention of declaring Taiwan\u2019s survival as inseparable from Japan\u2019s survival. Japanese prime ministers traditionally avoid such language, knowing how intensely Beijing reacts to any suggestion that Tokyo might intervene in a Taiwan crisis.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    But in a heated Diet session, a relentless opposition lawmaker cornered Takaichi with repeated questions on whether Japan would remain neutral if Taiwan were attacked.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Under pressure \u2014 live on national television \u2014 the inexperienced prime minister buckled.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    In an unguarded moment, she uttered the now-infamous line:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    \u201cTaiwan\u2019s survival is inseparable from Japan\u2019s survival.\u201d<\/p>\n

    \n

    The chamber went silent.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Beijing exploded.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Within hours, Chinese state media condemned the remark as a grave violation of the \u201cOne China\u201d principle. Naval and coast guard vessels surged across the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. Over 100 Chinese ships \u2014 including maritime militia armed vessels \u2014 were documented near Japan\u2019s southern approaches.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    What began as a slip of the tongue escalated into a regional crisis that threatened to topple Takaichi\u2019s new government.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    The Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 \u2014 Washington steps in<\/strong><\/h5>\n
    \n

    The US recognised immediately that Takaichi\u2019s collapse would create a power vacuum at the heart of Northeast Asia. Her downfall could embolden China, weaken Japan\u2019s resolve, and destabilise the US alliance system.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n

    Congress responded swiftly by passing the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026, which:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n
    • Reaffirmed US commitments under the TRA<\/li>\n
    • Strengthened military coordination with Taiwan<\/li>\n
    • Enhanced trilateral US\u2013Japan\u2013Taiwan contingency planning<\/li>\n
    • Signalled that coercion against Taiwan or Japan would trigger a stronger American response<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
      \n

      Yet the Act also reinforced a crucial point: US support for Taiwan cannot be used to harbour anti-China adventurism.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Washington deters Beijing \u2014 but does not seek confrontation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      It supports Taiwan\u2019s self-defence \u2014 but not unilateral moves towards independence. It reassures Japan \u2014 but does not encourage escalation. This balance has guided US policy for half a century.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      Why the US cannot \u2014 and will not \u2014 walk away<\/strong><\/h5>\n
      \n

      When one connects the historical dots, a clear pattern emerges:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      1971: US supports PRC\u2019s UN seat but does not abandon Taiwan.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      1972: US acknowledges China\u2019s stance but preserves ambiguity.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      1978-79: US normalises with Beijing yet passes TRA to protect Taiwan.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      1995-2020: Congress repeatedly upgrades Taiwan\u2019s defence and economic ties.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      2026: Taiwan Reassurance Act renews commitments amid rising tensions.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Each step reflects the same principle: the US recognises Beijing, but it will not allow Taiwan\u2019s fate to be determined by force.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Taiwan is a legal commitment (TRA), a strategic necessity (semiconductors), a democratic symbol (US political values), and now, a regional stabiliser (Japan\u2019s security and US alliance credibility).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Abandoning Taiwan would undermine American interests, alienate allies, embolden China, and unravel the Indo-Pacific balance.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      That is why \u2014 despite recognition of Beijing \u2014 the US has never renounced its commitments to Taiwan. And with the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 now in place, these commitments are stronger than at any point since 1979.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      Conclusion: East Asia\u2019s new strategic reality<\/strong><\/h5>\n
      \n

      Prime Minister Takaichi\u2019s accidental statement did not trigger a Japanese retreat \u2014 it triggered a deeper American embrace. China\u2019s attempt to exploit Japan\u2019s political fragility backfired, prompting Washington to solidify its regional networks.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      The US will not abandon Taiwan.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Not in the 1970s.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Not today.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      And not in the foreseeable future. That’s the realpolitik of US, Taiwan and China relationship. They have been triangulated.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      For Southeast Asia \u2014 especially Asean \u2014 this evolving triangular dynamic is not a distant contest. It will shape trade, security, diplomacy, and regional stability for decades.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      And the message is unmistakable:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      \n

      Taiwan remains a permanent feature of US strategy \u2014 forged by law, reinforced by politics, and now sealed by the realities of 2026.<\/p>\n

      The article was published in The Edge on 8 December 2025<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      By Professor Dr. Phar Kim Beng, Professor of ASEAN Stud […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39,"featured_media":3927,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[26,27],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3929","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category--zh-hans"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3929","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/39"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3929"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3929\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3938,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3929\/revisions\/3938"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3927"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3929"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3929"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/crossthinktank.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3929"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}