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By Professor Dr. Phar Kim Beng, Professor of ASEAN Studies at IINTAS-IIUM and Expert Committee Member of CROSS
ASEAN’s creation on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok was never the grand strategic leap that later narratives painted it to be. It was an experiment — a cautious attempt by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines to cultivate habits of cooperation in a region defined by insurgencies, rival nationalisms, and Cold War tensions.
By 1971, even with the adoption of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), few diplomats could clearly articulate ASEAN’s foundational purpose. Much of its early stability emerged not from ASEAN’s inherent strength but because great powers were preoccupied with the wars in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Thailand stood as the frontline bulwark, shielding Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia from Communist advances.
ASEAN was established to stabilise its members internally, not to eliminate every friction between them. This is why the Thailand–Cambodia clashes in 2008, 2011, and now 2025 strike so deeply. More than 300,000 people have been displaced along their 818-kilometre border. The world is again asking: how does ASEAN look when its own members exchange fire?
Malaysia did facilitate a credible peace framework — the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord — backed by the ASEAN Observers Team (AoT). This mechanism did not fail. It simply was not given the time required for verification. Landmine blasts and contested border incidents cannot be investigated in hours. When capitals act faster than investigators, escalation becomes unavoidable.
In this environment, seven reputational implications for ASEAN stand out.
First, ASEAN’s image as a peace-preserving community takes a hit.
The region promotes itself as a zone of peace. Yet when two ASEAN members fire artillery at each other, international observers question whether ASEAN can uphold that promise. Optics overshadow the mechanisms that already exist.
Second, ASEAN’s claim to centrality appears weakened.
When domestic politics in Thailand or nationalist pressures in Cambodia accelerate escalation, outsiders see national agendas overtaking regional commitments. This diminishes ASEAN’s reputation as a steady anchor in Southeast Asia.
Third, ASEAN’s economic brand is damaged.
ASEAN markets itself as a predictable region for investment. Border wars undermine that image. Investors begin to question whether cross-border corridors, labour mobility, and industrial linkages are as secure as ASEAN suggests.
Fourth, ASEAN looks slow or hesitant in crisis communication.
Without a rapid, joint fact-finding mechanism, narratives spin out of control. Rumours fill the gap. External audiences may interpret ASEAN’s silence or caution as indecision, even when verification is still underway.
Fifth, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy appears merely symbolic.
ADMM and ADMM-Plus exist to build trust among militaries. But when Thai and Cambodian forces clash despite these structures, outsiders doubt whether defence diplomacy has any practical preventive effect.
Sixth, non-state spoilers shape impressions of weak border governance.
Smugglers, loggers, and provocateurs thrive during conflict. Their presence complicates attribution and prolongs instability. This creates the perception that ASEAN cannot police its own peripheries or prevent opportunistic escalation.
Seventh, repeated clashes erode long-term confidence in ASEAN.
Each conflict chips away at the belief — held both inside and outside the region — that ASEAN is evolving into a genuine political and security community. Reputational damage accumulates with every recurrence.
The 2025 Thai–Cambodian conflict shows that peace is not automatic. It demands patience, restraint, and respect for the verification processes that ASEAN members negotiated themselves. No mechanism can produce instant clarity after explosions or troop movements.
ASEAN should not be blamed for the lack of immediate answers. It can work only if member states allow its processes the time they require.
When Thailand and Cambodia clash, the real test is not whether ASEAN can stop the first shot — but whether its members allow it to stop the next one.
