By Professor Dr. Phar Kim Beng, Professor of ASEAN Studies at IINTAS-IIUM and Expert Committee Member of CROSS
For decades, analysts have speculated whether the US might one day “walk away” from Taiwan, especially as China’s power grows. But such speculation misunderstands the full arc of American policy. From 1971 to 2026, Washington has repeatedly demonstrated that even when recognising Beijing diplomatically, it has never relinquished its commitments to Taiwan’s security, autonomy, and survival.
The passage of the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 only reaffirms this longstanding reality.
To understand why, one must revisit the diplomatic turning points that shaped US–Taiwan policy.
1971-1979: Recognition of Beijing without abandoning Taipei
When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 (1971), transferring China’s seat from Taipei to Beijing, many believed Taiwan’s international future was doomed. Washington supported the vote, yet the shift did not erase Taiwan from US strategic thinking.
The following year, President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China produced the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), where the US “acknowledged” — but did not accept — Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. This distinction was intentional. From that moment onwards, American policy rested on strategic ambiguity: recognising Beijing while refusing to endorse its claim over Taiwan.
When full normalisation occurred in 1978, with Washington recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China, the US again reaffirmed that Taiwan’s future must be determined peacefully. And on Jan 1, 1979, when the US formally ended diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Congress moved swiftly to fill the vacuum.
Within months, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) — a legislative masterstroke that ensured:
- Continued US arms sales to Taiwan
- Uninterrupted commercial and cultural ties
- A clear warning that any coercive takeover of Taiwan would be a matter of “grave concern” to the US
The TRA remains binding US law. No president can repeal it. No administration can ignore it.
Washington may have recognised Beijing, but it never abandoned Taipei.
Taiwan’s lobbying power and American elites
While the TRA provided legal protection, Taiwan built political resilience in Washington through one of the most sophisticated lobbying ecosystems in US foreign policy. Taipei invested in think tanks, congressional outreach, semiconductor partnerships, and long-term relationships across the American elite.
Taiwan’s role in the global economy — particularly its dominance of advanced semiconductor manufacturing — further cemented its indispensability. For US defence systems, artificial intelligence breakthroughs, and aerospace technologies, Taiwan is no longer a distant partner: it is a strategic core.
Taiwan became a political reality that no US president can afford to ignore.
Japan enters the equation — Through a crisis that almost collapsed a prime minister
Taiwan’s importance is not merely bilateral. In 2025–2026, Taiwan became the epicentre of a political storm inside Japan — and an unexpected catalyst for deeper US–Japan–Taiwan alignment.
Contrary to many media portrayals, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had no intention of declaring Taiwan’s survival as inseparable from Japan’s survival. Japanese prime ministers traditionally avoid such language, knowing how intensely Beijing reacts to any suggestion that Tokyo might intervene in a Taiwan crisis.
But in a heated Diet session, a relentless opposition lawmaker cornered Takaichi with repeated questions on whether Japan would remain neutral if Taiwan were attacked.
Under pressure — live on national television — the inexperienced prime minister buckled.
In an unguarded moment, she uttered the now-infamous line:
“Taiwan’s survival is inseparable from Japan’s survival.”
The chamber went silent.
Beijing exploded.
Within hours, Chinese state media condemned the remark as a grave violation of the “One China” principle. Naval and coast guard vessels surged across the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. Over 100 Chinese ships — including maritime militia armed vessels — were documented near Japan’s southern approaches.
What began as a slip of the tongue escalated into a regional crisis that threatened to topple Takaichi’s new government.
The Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 — Washington steps in
The US recognised immediately that Takaichi’s collapse would create a power vacuum at the heart of Northeast Asia. Her downfall could embolden China, weaken Japan’s resolve, and destabilise the US alliance system.
Congress responded swiftly by passing the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026, which:
- Reaffirmed US commitments under the TRA
- Strengthened military coordination with Taiwan
- Enhanced trilateral US–Japan–Taiwan contingency planning
- Signalled that coercion against Taiwan or Japan would trigger a stronger American response
Yet the Act also reinforced a crucial point: US support for Taiwan cannot be used to harbour anti-China adventurism.
Washington deters Beijing — but does not seek confrontation.
It supports Taiwan’s self-defence — but not unilateral moves towards independence. It reassures Japan — but does not encourage escalation. This balance has guided US policy for half a century.
Why the US cannot — and will not — walk away
When one connects the historical dots, a clear pattern emerges:
1971: US supports PRC’s UN seat but does not abandon Taiwan.
1972: US acknowledges China’s stance but preserves ambiguity.
1978-79: US normalises with Beijing yet passes TRA to protect Taiwan.
1995-2020: Congress repeatedly upgrades Taiwan’s defence and economic ties.
2026: Taiwan Reassurance Act renews commitments amid rising tensions.
Each step reflects the same principle: the US recognises Beijing, but it will not allow Taiwan’s fate to be determined by force.
Taiwan is a legal commitment (TRA), a strategic necessity (semiconductors), a democratic symbol (US political values), and now, a regional stabiliser (Japan’s security and US alliance credibility).
Abandoning Taiwan would undermine American interests, alienate allies, embolden China, and unravel the Indo-Pacific balance.
That is why — despite recognition of Beijing — the US has never renounced its commitments to Taiwan. And with the Taiwan Reassurance Act 2026 now in place, these commitments are stronger than at any point since 1979.
Conclusion: East Asia’s new strategic reality
Prime Minister Takaichi’s accidental statement did not trigger a Japanese retreat — it triggered a deeper American embrace. China’s attempt to exploit Japan’s political fragility backfired, prompting Washington to solidify its regional networks.
The US will not abandon Taiwan.
Not in the 1970s.
Not today.
And not in the foreseeable future. That’s the realpolitik of US, Taiwan and China relationship. They have been triangulated.
For Southeast Asia — especially Asean — this evolving triangular dynamic is not a distant contest. It will shape trade, security, diplomacy, and regional stability for decades.
And the message is unmistakable:
Taiwan remains a permanent feature of US strategy — forged by law, reinforced by politics, and now sealed by the realities of 2026.
The article was published in The Edge on 8 December 2025
